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This research focused on the assessment of the U.S. agricultural sector and human 
vulnerability to a Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak and the implications of a select set 
of alternative disease control strategies. Livestock impact assessment is done by using an 
integrated epidemic/economic model to examine the extent of RVF spread in the 
Southeast Texas livestock population and its consequences plus the outcome of 
implementing two different control strategies: emergency vaccination and larvicide 
vector control separately plus when they are used simultaneously. Human impact 
assessment utilized an inferential procedure, which comprises of a cost of illness 
calculation to assess the dollar cost of human illnesses and deaths, as well as a Disability 
Adjusted Life Year calculation to give an estimate of the burden of disease on public 
health as a whole. Results indicate substantial potential losses to the U.S., where 
combined livestock and human national costs ranged from $121 million to $2.3 billion.   
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Rift Valley Fever: An Economic Assessment of Agricultural and Human 
Vulnerability 
 
Risks of foreign animal or zoonotic disease outbreak are high today and may be rising 
for several reasons such as: increased international trade and travel; population growth; 
changing patterns of human–animal contact; increased demand for animal protein; 
increased wealth; environmental changes; and human encroachment on farm land and 
previously undisturbed wildlife habitat (IOM-NRC, 2008). Disease outbreaks can cause 
substantial economic losses to the agricultural sector (as reviewed in Elbakidze et al. 
(2009), Hagerman (2009), and Junker et al. (2008)) and may disrupt agricultural 
commodity markets. Zoonotic diseases, such as Rift Valley Fever, can spread from 
animals to humans and vice versa raising an additional dimension of vulnerability- 
human health. This paper focuses on the economic assessment of the agricultural and 
human vulnerability to a Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak plus the value of alternative 
disease control strategies in reducing disease impacts.  
Meltzer et al. (1999) estimated what the economic impact would be for the U.S. if an 
influenza pandemic were to occur and found costs ranging from US$71.3 to $166.5 
billion. Attavanich et al. (2010) looked at the effects of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak and its 
media coverage on consumer demand and agriculture markets and found that roughly 
$156.5 million was lost in market revenue for lean hogs alone. Therefore, in order to 
grasp the full economic impact of a zoonotic disease such as RVF, efforts must be made 
to value the impacts to both animals and humans. 
The assessment involves examinations of livestock and human vulnerability.  For the 
livestock assessment, an integrated epidemic/economic model is used to examine 
vulnerability and the effect of alternative control strategies in a case study region - 
Southeast Texas. Specifically, vaccination and larvicide for disease intervention used 
both independently and jointly, are examined.   For the human assessment an inferential 
procedure is used involving a Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) calculation on 4 
 
public health cost. Information from West Nile Virus (WNV), another vector-borne 
disease that has been observed in the U.S., is used to infer disease spread.  
1  DISEASE BACKGROUND 
Rift Valley Fever is a vector-borne zoonotic disease which was first identified in Kenya 
in 1931. It is currently confined to the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula. RVF 
mainly affects humans, sheep, cattle and goats. In infected livestock, the main symptoms 
are pregnant female abortions and young animal mortality. Human infection may result 
in hemorrhagic fever among other illnesses (CDC 2010). The two main carriers or 
vectors of RVF are Aedes and Culex mosquitoes although other mosquito types and 
biting insects can also transmit the disease (Martin et al. 2008).  
Historically, outbreaks of RVF have been strongly correlated with heavy rainfall in drier 
areas. This is most likely related to the fact that the disease is vertically transmitted by 
mosquitoes with drought resistant eggs that hatch under flooding (Peters and Linthicum 
1994).  This is why Southeast Texas was chosen for the case study as the conditions 
match.  
The virus has become endemic in a number of countries, indicating that an outbreak in a 
disease-free country may also lead to RVF becoming endemic. For this reason, as well 
as others, RVF is viewed as a major disease threat to the United States. 
2  Livestock Impact Analysis 
Since there have been no U.S. outbreaks and U.S. production conditions are typically 
quite different from those in Africa, we will use a model to simulate a hypothetical 
outbreaks and then value the effects with an economic model.  
2.1  Modeling Setup 
The specific models being used are the RVF epidemic model developed by Gaff et al. 
(2007) and the Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) developed by McCarl and coworkers 
(as described in Adams et al. 2005).   5 
 
2.1.1  Epidemic model 
The epidemic model (Gaff et al. 2007) is a mathematical model for two populations of 
mosquito species, one that can transmit vertically and one that cannot, and for one 
livestock population. The two populations of mosquitoes assumed to be viable 
transmission vectors are Aedes and Culex mosquitoes. The Aedes mosquitoes become a 
carrier of the virus through either vertical transmission (parent was a carrier) or via 
feeding on an infected host. The Culex mosquito only transmits by feeding on infected 
hosts. In turn, the disease is transmitted by feeding on livestock. Once infectious, 
mosquitoes remain infectious for the remainder of their lifespan. The livestock fed upon 
then die or recover having lifelong immunity from re-infection. This model is the 
template used to create a simpler Monte Carlo simulation to estimate disease impact 
across a large number of scenarios. The simulation provides a good estimate of an 
outbreak for relative assessment of various regions, inputs or interventions. This 
simulation was created by Hartley et al. (2009). 
2.1.2  Economic Model 
The economic model is the ASM component of the Forest and Agricultural Sector 
Optimization Model (FASOM) which is a dynamic, nonlinear programming model of 
the forest and agricultural sectors in the United States, originally developed to evaluate 
the welfare and market impacts of alternative policies and documented in Adams et al. 
(2005). The ASM is a partial equilibrium agricultural sector model that endogenizes 
market prices as documented in Adams et al. (2005). The model depicts the allocation of 
land, over time, to competing activities in both the forest and agricultural sectors and is 
also designed to aid in the appraisal of a wider range of forest and agricultural sector 
policies. The modeling system of FASOM is designed to work on the forest and/or 
agricultural sectors either independently or simultaneously allowing for evaluation of 
independent sector issues, or across both sectors. This study examines only that of the 
agricultural sector. 6 
 
Partial equilibrium models, like ASM, utilize sets of supply and demand relationships 
which recognize interdependencies between markets in the U.S. Through this model, 
there is ability to assess the direct and secondary effects of an animal disease outbreak 
by including not only initial prices and quantities, but price shifts as demand varies.  
This study will not directly vary the demand curves. However, there may be a shift in 
quantity demanded as the price adjusts in response to the supply shift.     
The FASOM model is based on a joint, price-endogenous, market structure. Prices are 
endogenously determined given demand functions and supply processes. It simulates 36 
primary crop and livestock commodities and 39 secondary commodities that compete for 
land, labor, and irrigation water at the regional level. Competition allows for 
simultaneous price determination in both sectors. Land use is capable of changing over 
time, and constraints on production possibilities can be relaxed, which is a valuable 
aspect when analyzing animal disease outbreaks which may become endemic.  
Maximization of net present value of the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus for 
each sector allows the model to provide estimates of total welfare, as well as the 
distribution of welfare between producers and consumers as discussed in McCarl and 
Spreen (1980). 
2.1.3  Model Integration 
The integrated epidemic-economic model used is an extension of a previous RVF study 
done by Hartley et al. (2009). Outputs from the epidemic model are fed into the 
economic model. The epidemic model output will give a number of animals in each 
disease related state and is categorized as below.  
  Young_Susceptible 
  Adult_susceptible 
  Pregnant_susceptile 
  Young_Infected 
  Young_dead 7 
 
  Pregnant_Infected 
  Pregnant_dead 
  Abortions 
  Adult_infected 
  Adult_dead 
  Young_vaccinated 
  Pregnant_vaccinated 
  Adult_vaccinated 
These categories are used to alter the economic data for (1) cow/calf and (2) dairy 
operations. 
In order to adjust the economic model to reflect the results from the epidemic model 
certain conversions of the data need to be made. Since budgets in the ASM are 
normalized as typical single animal budgets, the epidemic data in terms of head 
slaughtered, vaccinated, infected, culled and dead from the disease must also be 
normalized in terms of the proportions of the animals affected. This allows the impact of 
the outbreak to be spread evenly across the entire region reducing the per animal average 
production and cost. The cost increase reflects the costs of vaccination, carcass disposal, 
and culling. This study also incorporates a decrease in feed requirements as a result of 
loss of animals.  
2.2  Case Study Region and Data 
This study analyzes the economic impacts of a disease outbreak of RVF in Southeast 
Texas. This region was chosen under the assumption that it is vulnerable to a RVF 
outbreak due to several factors: 1) Similarity of the environment of the region to the 
areas in Africa where RVF now exists with high yearly rainfall, short cold period, 
prevalent swampy areas, 2) High livestock population with many cow/calf and beef 
operations, 3) High mosquito populations with many potential mosquito breeding sites; 8 
 
4) Close proximity to the ocean and  ports of entry and 5) High human population 
including the city of Houston.  
To characterize the region we use cattle and herd size data collected from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS 2010) for the Texas counties east of Interstate 
Highway 35 and south of Interstate Highway 10.  
To avoid national security concerns and overcome missing regional data, regional cattle 
inventory data were plotted as a histogram and then smoothed to fit (using maximum 
likelihood estimation) a lognormal PDF
1. Random draws were then taken to yield a 
representative sample of simulated county cattle inventories.  
The disease spread model assumes that all cattle begin as "susceptible". The susceptible 
populations are those that are vulnerable to infection and death, this number is reduced 
under vaccination scenarios. Under vaccination we assume that 43.87% (arbitrarily 
chosen in the epidemic model from a range of 25%-75%) of each susceptible population 
is vaccinated resulting in a 33% reduction in infection, abortions and death. The 
epidemic is assumed to be confined to Texas, but state, regional, and national economic 
impacts will be evaluated.  
 
2.2.1  Economic assumptions 
The direct cost incurred as a result of an RVF outbreak is captured in our disease 
management cost estimates. Disease management cost is the number of animals infected 
times the cost per head of disease management. The disease management cost 
component consists of costs to clean and disinfect the premises plus the cost of 
surveillance. These costs are incurred under all scenarios. The vaccination scenario also 
includes the cost to vaccinate. The larvicide scenario includes the costs of the larvicides. 
The costs are based on a schedule that varies by the size of the herd, and are adapted 
                                                 
1 The lognormal was chosen arbitrarily. However, the basic properties of the lognormal function reflect the 
characteristics of the cattle inventory data, namely that a few counties have zero or very few cattle while  
some counties have extremely high populations of cattle.  9 
 
from Galli’s (2009) cost estimates, adjusted for herd size specific to the regions in Texas 
for this study. All cost assumptions include cost of personnel, supplies, and equipment. 
The affected animals in the ASM were limited to cow/calf beef operations and dairy 
operations. Affected calves were limited to calves for slaughter, dairy calves, steer 
calves, and heifer calves.   
  The cost of disposal for beef and dairy cattle were assumed to be a fixed cost of 
$50 each head. 
  The cost of cleaning and disinfecting for beef and dairy cattle was assumed to be 
$37 and $23 per head, respectively. 
  Vaccination costs for beef and dairy cattle were assumed to be $32 and $10 per 
head, respectively.  
  Cost of surveillance the beef and dairy cattle were assumed to be $113 and $34 
per head, respectively.  
  Cost to apply larvicide at the 5% reduction rate was assumed to be $187 per head 
infected. We assumed a constant square mile coverage of 27.5 sq mi. To develop 
a per-head cost we divided this by the number of infected cattle under base 
practices.  
Further assumptions were made regarding disposal and culling of infected animals.  It 
was assumed that 100% of dead animals will be disposed of, while 50% of adult and 
pregnant infected animals will be disposed and 50% will be culled for disease 
management purposes. Seventy-five percent of young infected animals will be disposed 
of for disease management purposes. We assume that the RVF outbreak results in a short 
term shock in production, but that no producers will exit the market as a result; therefore, 
replacement heifer populations are adjusted as well. The population of potential 
replacement heifers is reduced by abortions, young heifer deaths and pregnant cow 
deaths as well as those young heifer cattle that are culled or disposed of due to infection. 
Outside of the reduced replacements, cow/calf budgets also need to be reduced directly 
by non-pregnant adult deaths, young deaths, abortions, pregnant adult deaths, and 
infected animals that are culled or disposed of. Dairy cattle are treated similarly. There 10 
 
will also be a reduced milk supply by abortions, young deaths, pregnant cow deaths as 
well as young cattle culled or disposed due to infection. Only those animals culled due to 
abortion are assumed to increase meat sale. Labor requirements are also decreased by .04 
times the number of infected animals to better simulate the conditions under an outbreak. 
With fewer animals in the region due to abortions, death and culling of infected animals, 
fewer labor hours would be needed due to smaller herd numbers.   
All feed budgets will be decreased by the number of dead animals and infected animals 
that are culled or disposed of for disease management purposes. The reason for this 
being simply that the demand for feed will be reduced due to a decrease in number of 
livestock; fewer animals will need to be fed and therefore less feed will be bought. This 
decrease in demand of feed in the infected region will result in an increase in the overall 
national supply of feed, which could lead to a change in price for the related feeds.  
  
2.3  Case study set up 
The epidemic model was used to simulate a base case and alternative control strategies. 
In particular, we modeled the effect of an outbreak under base practices, along with 
vaccination, larvicide, and vaccination and larvicide together, as compared to a base 
scenario of no disease. Specifically, four scenarios will be run  
  Base practices. We simulate the disease spread with the control strategieslimited to 
culling and standard veterinary (called base below) practices.   
  Vaccination of the herds plus the base practices. Specifically, we assume 43.87% 
of the herd is vaccinated resulting in a 33% reduction in infection, death and 
abortion.  
  Larvicide applied to the vector population plus the base practices. Specifically, we 
assume that larvicide usage causes a 5% reduction in mosquito population.  
  Vaccination and larvicide used together plus the base practices. 11 
 
To start the epidemic we assume the virus was introduced into a randomly selected 
Texas county, and in turn the disease spread was stochastic based on the vector density. 
One thousand random draws were used and fed into the ASM.    
 
2.4  Livestock Results 
Detailed results for the integrated epidemic and economic modelling will first be 
presented. The cost of illness and DALY results will comprise the last part of this 
section.  
2.4.1  Epidemic Model Results 
The epidemic model yields results on animal losses by animal category and control 
scenario, which are used as input into the economic model. Summary statistics for the 
corresponding herd category under each scenario can be seen in Table 1. The control 
scenario with the most infections, deaths, and abortions is the base practices case. Each 
of the three more aggressive control strategies reduces the number of infections, deaths 
and abortions.  The largest reduction in animal losses from the base practices is 
combining vaccination along with larvicide, which results in having less infection, 
abortions and death among the herd population.  The strategy with the smallest reduction 
is the larvicide case and vaccination falls in between with much larger reductions than 
vaccination  12 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Number of Head Infected, Dead, or Aborted in 1000’s, for 
RVF Outbreak with Base practices 
  Base  With vaccination  With larvicide  With larv and vac 
 
Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev 
young_infected  4.1  4.0  2.7  2.7  3.9  3.9  2.7  2.6 
young_dead  2.0  2.4  1.4  1.6  2.0  2.3  1.3  1.6 
abortions  26.1  16.3  17.6  10.9  25.3  15.8  17.0  10.6 
pregnant_dead  4.1  2.7  2.8  1.8  4.0  2.6  2.7  1.7 
pregnant_infected  34.8  20.3  23.4  13.7  33.7  19.7  22.7  13.3 
adult_infected  38.3  20.1  25.8  13.5  37.1  19.5  25.0  13.1 
adult_dead  4.2  2.7  2.8  1.8  4.1  2.6  2.8  1.7 
 
 
Economic Model Results 
The epidemic model results were used to adjust the corresponding budgets in the ASM. 
This study restricts the outbreak to that of the Southwest and Southcentral region of the 
model. Since these regions contribute significantly to the national supply of livestock, 
the impacts in other regions may occur as a result of national price changes. This section 
will display the results of national welfare loss, as well as total livestock producer 
welfare and regional producer welfare effects of a RVF outbreak.  
 
Total Welfare Loss Under Alternative Control Strategies 
The total welfare loss results are presented in millions of 2004$ and can be seen in Table 
2 and Figure 1. Base practices results in the lowest level of economic damages despite 
the fact that it results in the highest livestock damage, which indicates that the costs of 
these control strategies outweigh their benefits in terms of the value of reduced animal 
losses. The highest loss occurs under the larvicide control strategy, which is likely the 
direct result of the practice cost coupled with relatively low effectiveness (5%). 
Vaccination results in the lowest mean loss across the more aggressive control strategies; 
however, it has the highest median loss and a high standard deviation compared to the 13 
 
other control strategies. Thus, vaccination has the potential to result in a lower economic 
loss but there is a risk of high losses. The vaccination and larvicide combined strategy, 
which resulted in the smallest amount of livestock damages results in the second highest 
average economic damages, falling between vaccination and larvicide as might be 
expected. These results indicate that, under these particular control strategies, there is 
little opportunity to reduce national welfare damages.  However, policy makers may not 
base decisions on the national welfare damages, rather the focus may shift to those 
strategies that provide the greatest chances of survivability to livestock producers.    
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Total National Welfare Loss 
 
Table 2. Total National Welfare Loss in Millions of 2004$ 
   Base practices  Vaccination  Larvicide (5%)  Vaccination and Larvicide 
Mean  -5.61  -9.42  -26.76  -16.23 
StDev  17.00  19.94  5.06  16.82 
 
        
























Regional Producer Surplus Impacts 
The economic model divides the U.S. into 10 different production regions, which can be 
seen in Error! Reference source not found.2 below.  With the U.S. livestock industry 
being concentrated in certain regions, such as the dairy regions in the Pacific Southwest, 
Lake States and Northeast or the concentrated beef feeding regions in the Southwest, 
Rocky Mountains and Great Plains, impacts of an animal disease outbreak will most 
likely have stronger impacts on some regions rather than others depending on the region 
in which it originates. For this reason, producer impacts are broken out by regions.  
 
 
Figure 2. Regions in ASM Model 
 
While there is an overall loss in welfare with each control strategy that exceeds the 
national loss in welfare from the base practices scenario, results indicate that under some 
conditions, producers in regions outside of the outbreak can gain due to price changes. 
Average results for regional producer (both crop and livestock producers) surplus 
impacts in both the infected and non-infected regions under the 4 scenarios can be seen 
in Figure 3 below. Detailed producer surplus loss for each of the 10 regions can be seen 
in the table given in the appendix. The two regions with the higher damages in each 15 
 
scenario are South Central (SC) and South West (SW), where the outbreak occurred. 
Although the overall national welfare experiences the least damages under the base 
practices scenario, the regions where the outbreak occurred (SC and SW) experience the 
most damages under this scenario. The least damages for the outbreak region occur 
under the vaccination and larvicide together scenario and vaccination alone scenario, for 
the SC and SW regions respectively, more in line with the results from the epidemic 
analysis. Under these two control strategies cattle prices increase and fewer animals are 
lost; therefore opportunities exist for other livestock producers to sell their animals at the 
higher price. Thus, the cost of investing in these control strategies may be beneficial for 
the producers in the infected region. However, these scenarios also result in higher 
damages to those producers outside the infected regions, and increases overall national 
welfare loss. Here the assumption has been made that producers will remain in operation 
after the outbreak has occurred; however, if policy makers wish to select a disease 
control program that offers the better chance of this occurring it may result in higher 
national losses due to the cost of implementing those control strategies.  
 
Figure 3. Infected and Non-infected Area Mean Producer Welfare Loss for All Scenarios in 
Millions 
 
3  HUMAN VALUATION 
To analyze the effect of a RVF outbreak on public health, we need to develop 
assumptions on the extent of the outbreak.  However, there has never been a RVF 
outbreak in the U.S. The way humans interact with animals and are exposed to mosquito 








bites is different in the U.S. from that of the Arabian Peninsula and Africa as are animal 
slaughter procedures, which creates different degrees of potential disease exposure.   
Therefore, using data from human illness in Africa and applying it to U.S. human health 
estimators is inappropriate. 
As a consequence this study uses spread data from the initial outbreak of 1999 West Nile 
Virus (WNV) to estimate human infections.  Data from the CDC on costs of illness, 
deaths, and hospitalizations are then applied to assess the economic costs. More 
specifically the rate of infection we use will be that given in Nash et al. (2001) and the 
calculation of the cost utilizes the data given in Meltzer et al. (1999) 
3.1  Employing the West Nile Virus Spread Data 
WNV first originated in the U.S. in Queens County in 1999 and had spread to a total of 
10 adjacent counties by 2000. We will apply this geographic spread rate to construct a 
potential human spread rate of RVF. A random outbreak county is chosen in the region 
of Texas used for the livestock outbreak simulation. To construct this outbreak we 
followed 3 basic steps: 
Step 1.   Assemble the infection rates from Nash et al. (2001) which can be seen in 
Appendix Error! Reference source not found.. 
Step 2.   Assemble data on the population in the study region from the U.S. census 
bureau. 
Step 3.   Apply the infection rates to the population yielding the infected 
population of 24.4, which can be seen below in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Number of Estimated Infected Persons in Corresponding Texas Counties 
 
Age group 0-17  Age group 18-65  Age group 65+  Total 
Brazoria  0.10  0.85  0.56  1.51 
Galveston  0.09  0.95  0.55  1.58 
Matagorda  0.01  0.16  0.07  0.23 
Harris  1.34  9.69  7.45  18.49 
Fort Bend  0.17  1.08  1.06  2.31 
Wharton  0.01  0.18  0.07  0.26 
Total  1.72  12.92  9.77  24.4 
 
3.2  Cost of Illness 
To calculate the total cost of illness for the first year of a hypothetical outbreak, the 
number of hospitalized cases was rounded up to 25. The categorization of outcomes was 
as follows: 
  Death 
  Hospitalized 
  Outpatient Visits 
  Ill, but no medical care sought 
For this study, we use the rates of underreporting given by the CDC for influenza to 
better estimate total human vulnerability. Each reported hospitalized case represents 2.7 
unreported hospitalized cases of which one percent results in death. Each case of 
infection also represents a certain number of illnesses that go unreported. Estimates were 
made under four different levels of underreporting of infection (non-hospitalized) cases. 
This means for each reported hospitalized case there are 10, 20, 50 or 80 unreported 
hospitalized cases.  
The number of reported cases was varied from 25 to 6,000. These different levels reflect 
possibilities for the reportedly more virulent character of RVF (see Gay et al. 2006 for 
discussion) as WNV reached a total of 9,862 reported cases in 2003. The assumed 
number of hospitalized cases are reported in Table 4. The dollar cost for each case is 18 
 
computed by using the estimated cost per case from Meltzer et al. (1999), for each 
category and each age group (Appendix Error! Reference source not found.). 
 
Table 4. Reported and Unreported Hospitalized Cases 
Reported  Unreported  Total 
25  43  68 
625  1,063  1,688 
2,000  3,400  5,400 
6,000  10,200  16,200 
 
 
The cost of the outbreak was computed using the DALY concept which is global 
measure of disease burden (WHO, 2010). One DALY can be thought of as one lost year 
of healthy life. It is calculated as the number of Years of Life Lost (YLL) plus the 
number of Years of Life lost due to Disability (YLD)  where 
DALY = YLL + YLD 
where  
 YLL    = N x L 
        N   = Number of deaths 
        L   = Life expectancy at age of death 
YLD   = I x DW x L 
        I    = Number of incident cases 
DW   = Disability weight 
        L   = Average duration of case until remission or death in years 
Average life expectancy was taken from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The 
average number of deaths and number of incident cases were taken from Table 5. Since 19 
 
RVF does not have a unique disability weight
2, the disability weight for dengue fever 
and dengue hemorrhagic fever are used which are 0.197 and 0.545 respectively. Since 
the average duration of illness under RVF is 3-7 days (WHO) we used 5 days and 
divided by 365 to get on a scale of years.  
Cost of Illness Results 
The cost of illness results for the alternative cases was reported with alternative numbers 
of unreported cases (10, 20, 50, or 80 per reported case) as can be seen in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5. Cost of Illness for alternative numbers of cases in Million $ 
   Cases 
 
 
25  625  2000  3000  6000 
1  to 10  4.47  114.50  366.41  549.62  1,099.23 
1 to 20  5.14  131.66  421.31  631.96  1,263.92 
1 to 50  7.15  183.12  409.79  878.99  1,757.99 
1 to 80  9.16  234.59  750.69  1,126.03  2,252.06 
 
If RVF were to be introduced into the U.S. and follow the path of WNV, which reached 
over 9,000 reported cases in 2003, economic damages can be expected to be in the 
billions. The results for the reported cases of 6,000 with a low estimate of total cases 
shows a total cost of $1.1 billion while the high estimate shows a total cost of $2.3 
billion.  
Disability Adjusted Life Years Results 
The results from the Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) can be seen in Table 6 
below. As would be expected, the DALYs increase as number of cases increase. With a 
number of reported cases equal to 25, the total number of DALYs lost is 297. As this 
                                                 
2 A disability weight is a weight factor that reflects the severity of a disease on a scale from 0 (perfect 
health) to 1 (equivalent to death). It quantifies judgments on overall health at different health states, it does 
not quantify or value the quality of life or the value of live.   20 
 
number increases, or as the virus spreads throughout the country to a number of reported 
cases equal to 6000, the total number of DALYs lost is equal to 71,216.   
Table 6. DALY Results 
Number of Cases  DALY 
25  297 
625  7418 
2000  23739 
6000  71216 
 
As stated by Meltzer (2010), one of the more important components of a DALY is the 
YLL value, the value that shows how many deaths and to which age group they belong. 
Another important factor when dealing with public health issues and disease outbreak is 
who is going to get sick and how many. Error! Reference source not found. gives a 
breakdown of the number of hospitalizations, sick, dead, YLL, and YLD for the given 
three age groups (under 18, between 18 and 65, and 65+).  As the table shows, those 
aged between 18 and 65 have the most cases of hospitalization, sickness, and deaths. The 
most YLL occurs for those under age 18, seeing as how the younger population would 
have a greater number of life expectancy, with more to lose in this parameter.  
 21 
 
Table 7. Breakdown of Case Severity and YLL by Age Group 
Number of Cases = 25  Hospitalized  Sick  Dead  YLD  YLL 
under 18  24  6,305  0.876  17  129 
18< x <65  37  9,819  1.364  27  115 
above 65  7  1,876  0.261  5  4 
Number of Cases = 625           
under 18  591  157,635  22  427  3231 
18< x <65  921  245,475  34  666  2863 
above 65  176  46,890  7  127  105 
Number of Cases = 2000           
under 18  1,892  504,432  70  1368  10338 
18< x <65  2,946  785,520  109  2130  9160 
above 65  563  150,048  21  407  336 
Number of Cases = 6000           
under 18  5,675  1,513,296  210  4103  31014 
18< x <65  8,837  2,356,560  327  6389  27481 
above 65  1,688  450,144  63  1220  1009 
 
 
4  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Zoonotic disease outbreaks can cause economic losses for both livestock and humans. 
This study developed information on the potential livestock and human vulnerability to 
RVF. In addition, the economic implications for livestock of using a number of control 
strategies for RVF are examined.  
Results indicate that a lower vulnerability in terms of the number of infected, aborted, 
and dead animals is achieved by coupling vaccination along with larvicide.  On the cost 
side RVF results in a national welfare loss ranging from approximately $6 million to $26 
million on average across scenarios examined. None of the control strategies examined 
here were successful in reducing the national welfare loss under base practices, 
indicating that the treatment costs exceeds the value of the reduced livestock damage 
vulnerability from the control strategies. Therefore, the strategy selected among these 
alternatives will depend on the policy makers' criteria for ranking strategies. If the 
ultimate goal is to reduce infections, abortions and deaths in the livestock population, 22 
 
then vaccination along with larvicide is the best answer. However, if the goal is to 
reduce economic impact, then selecting any of the three control strategies examined here 
does not offer significant benefit over standard culling and veterinary practices. .  
Yet another alternative decision making criteria is to select that control strategy that 
offers that highest producer survivability by reducing losses in the region where 
infection occurs. The losses from the outbreak fall to livestock producers and processors, 
as consumer welfare is increased with each scenario due to a drop in prices of some 
commodities, and in some instances, an increase in supply as well. The highest livestock 
producer damages are seen in the regions of the outbreak, but other regions with 
significant livestock industries or feed grain production (such as the Corn Belt, Lake 
States, and Southeast regions) also see high damages due to price changes. Vaccination 
and vaccination plus larvicide result in lower infected regional producer surplus losses 
than in the base practices scenario, indicating potential benefits in terms of producer 
survivability but at the cost of greater national welfare losses.  
In terms of the public health sector the costs are higher. Results indicate that the age 
group most affected by an outbreak would be those aged 18-65. Since we do not have 
RVF infection rates for humans, this is due to the fact that this age group makes up the 
highest percentage of population in the selected outbreak region.  
Combining total loss estimates from the cost of illness and ASM models, potential 
damage of a RVF outbreak could range from $121 million to $2.3 billion. The results of 
this study show the economic damages of an outbreak in year one to be roughly three 
times greater in the livestock population relative to the human population. It should be 
pointed out that both cost estimates are most likely under estimated. The animal 
outbreak is not incorporating all susceptible livestock (e.g. hogs and goats), and the 
human illness is not incorporating other damages to society (e.g. damages due to loss of 
tourism). 
This study could be extended by using an appropriate human disease spread model plus 
consideration of species other than cattle, as well as control strategies for both public 23 
 
health and agriculture sectors. Future follow up research could also incorporate demand 
issues including domestic beef demand reduction based on food safety concerns and 
trade bans. 
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Table 8. Infection Rate of WNV Per Million Population Adapted from Nash et al. 2001 
Age  Rate of Infection per million pop 
0-17  0.9 
18-59  3.425 
60+  30.8 
 
Table 9. Regional Producer Surplus Loss in Millions 
 
Base practices  Vaccination  Larvicide  Vaccination and Larvicide 
CB   -11.619  -34.777  -41.459  -36.633 
GP   24.720  8.187  0.192  7.193 
LS   -11.314  -27.510  -52.212  -51.027 
NE   2.062  -0.056  -3.995  -1.949 
RM   -3.476  3.941  -10.741  -4.367 
PSW   0.748  0.728  -0.342  0.587 
PNWE   -4.187  -3.907  -7.633  -6.581 
SC   -96.039  -84.643  -104.916  -81.001 
SE   -45.649  -50.891  -59.192  -51.406 




Table 10. Values Used to Calculate Cost of Illness 2010 US$ adapted from Meltzer 1999 
      Age group    
   0-19  20-64  65+ 
Deaths          
avg. age  9  35  74 
PV lost earning($)  1,016,101  1,037,673  65,837 
hosp. cost($)  3,435±2,632  7,605±3,888  8,309±3,692 
subtotal($)  1,019,536  1,045,278  74,146 
Hospitalizations          
hosp. cost($)  2,936±2,099  6,016±2,086  6,856±3,200 
net pay for outpatient visit($)  74±40  94±70  102±60 
avg. copayment for 
outpatient($)  5  4  4 
net payment for drug claims($)  26±9  42±30  41±10 
days lost  5±2.7  8±4.8  10±5.4 
value of 1 day lost($)  65  100  or 
subtotal($)  3,366  6,842  7,653 
Outpatient visits          
avg. no. visits  1.52  1.52  1.52 
net payment per visit($)  49±13  38±12  50±16 
avg. copayment for outpatient 
visit($)  5  4  4 
net payment per prescription($)  25±18  36±27  36±22 
avg.  prescriptions per visit  0.9  1.8  1.4 
avg. copayment per 
prescription($)  3  3  3 
days lost  3  2  5 
value 1 day lost($)  65  100  65 
subtotal($)  300  330  458 
Ill, no medical care sought          
Days lost  3  2  5 
Value 1 day lost($)  65  100  65 
over-the-counter drugs($)  2  2  2 
subtotal($)  197  202  327 
 
 